The Balance Of Power

Revisionist History

As I was intending to write on the subject of the European Union on this occasion, I thought it prudent to check its origins and, in particular, the oft-repeated claim that the Union was conceived (at least in part) as a means of restraining German aggression, which had been responsible for the two World Wars. Perhaps in more innocent times, pre-pandemic, when one assigned a modicum of credibility to approved narratives, I might have been surprised by what I found. That is no longer the case – which is probably for the best – notwithstanding the uncertainty engendered by a near-constant reordering of reality.

Which is not to completely absolve our Teutonic cousins from all responsibility, but rather to apportion it more equitably between the Great Powers, as was. In the early twentieth century these were Britain, France and Russia on the one hand and Austro-Hungary, Italy and Germany on the other. The Ottoman Empire, a fixture for centuries, was in terminal decline, a circumstance that occasioned regional instability in the Balkans, as Austro-Hungary and Russia sought to fill the coming vacuum.

But some Powers were more equal than others, though none would acknowledge frailty. France, Britain and Austria were all major colonial powers but, of the three, only Britain was still truly in the first rank of the Powers. The Austro-Hungarians were also raging at the dying of the light but, as has been the case with fading empires since time immemorial, they were not about to go gently into that good night. The Italians were cosplaying and, as an ally, were more of a hindrance than a help, mostly due to their propensity for reneging on agreements whenever it appeared that they might actually be required to pony up.

Then there was the 'German Problem'. If we are to understand the whys and wherefores of the EU, we need to get a grip on that first and acquire an understanding of what actually happened in the century prior to 1945, rather than the version that we have been fed. To the Germans themselves, there wasn't a problem at all. It was just that every other European Power (which meant every Global Power, at the time) thought that there was. Russia was also regarded with uncertainty, but a united Germany was geographically inconvenient.

Until Bismarck's signal achievement, finally completed in the wake of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71 – a conflict precipitated by France's attempt to reassert its dominant position in continental Europe – there had been no Germany. The previous iteration of the German-speaking sovereign states of central Europe had been under the Austrian yoke until 1866, whereupon Prussia prevailed in a short war over the Empire and established the North German Confederation. When most southern German states joined in January 1871, the German Empire was born and the global balance of power underwent something of a do-over. The Germans were good with that – others, not so much.

The Problem – for them – was that a united Germany was going to be too big of a player and, if not impeded in some way, would inevitably eclipse them. However, rather than present the Problem in a peevish way, reflective of their insecurities, they preferred to frame it as a fault with the Germans themselves. Too powerful would equate to wars of aggression, so the tall poppy needed to be trimmed. This narrative is still alive and kicking in 2025, with Germany allegedly the instigator of three European wars since 1870.(1) There was no room for any explanation which acknowledged that national fortunes ebb and flow over history and that a unified Germany should be allowed to takes its place on merit.

Instead, a system of alliances developed after the Franco-Prussian War. The Powers jockeyed for position and, over time, two hostile groups of Powers were formed, each suspicious of the other. The Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente gradually became ranged against each other. Much has been made of the economic rivalries that accompanied the Industrial Revolution – particularly the one between Germany and England:

“But if one reads the diplomatic correspondence of the years before the War....it is not so much questions of economic rivalry as those of prestige, armies and navies, the Balance of Power, and possible shiftings in the systems of alliances which...raise the temperature in Foreign Offices to the danger point.”(2)

Germany's seizure of Alsace-Lorraine, on the other hand, was a running sore for the French, despite the fact that most of the population spoke German dialects. But that didn't make them German thinking and their protests were bitter, vigorous and in vain. Bismarck himself thought it a blunder, correctly assessing that it would permanently sour relations and threaten the peace of Europe,(3) but feared the appearance of meekness – the seizure of territory had historically been within the gift of the victor, all the more so when triumphing over an aggressor state. And so Germany's Chancellor sought close relations with the Great Powers bordering his creation in the south and the east; Austria and Russia.

The Entente of the Three Emperors was the upshot, accompanied by secret provisions between Germany and Russia, whereby they each guaranteed the other the assistance of 200,000 troops if either were attacked by another European Power. Russia and Austria also made arrangements, though of a less binding character.(4) But harmonious relations between the Teutons and Slavs were not to last and it wasn't long before the Russians were casting a jaundiced eye in Bismarck's direction, believing him to lack impartiality in brokering agreements between themselves and the Dual Monarchy, particular with regard to Bosnia and Herzegovina which Austria annexed in 1878. The hostile vibes resulted in a secret alliance between Germany and Austria alone, focussed on defence against a Russian attack, which became the “very foundation rock of Germany policy” until 1918.(5) Things were starting to get messy. And two years later, Bismarck was at it again with an über-secret non-aggression pact with the Russians.

Reading accounts of the ever-present diplomatic intrigues indulged in by all the Great Powers is somewhat exhausting. Their obsession with prestige and their neuroticism ensured that even minor incidents had the potential to trigger conflicts. Whilst the Germans had no interest in the Balkans – Bismarck famously stating that “the whole Eastern question was not worth the bones of a Pomeranian grenadier” -(6) Austria and Russia had reasons to butt heads. The significant Slav contingent within the Austrian Empire was regularly outraged by the excesses of the Turks in Bosnia and the Russians were similarly vexed at the treatment meted out to the Balkan Christians. Bismarck persuaded them to agree to spheres of influence, which took much of the heat out of the situation in the 1880s.

Italy, meanwhile, was suffering through another humiliation, this time at the hands of the French, who had occupied Tunis before the Italians could do so themselves. Ever willing to ride on the coattails of others, she requested a treaty with Germany and Austria. Bismarck was under no illusions as to the quality of their friendship, noting the Italians' “fickle character”, “childish egoism” and “the restless, arrogant character of Italy's policy, which might easily involve her friends in trouble”.(7) He nonetheless acceded to the Triple Alliance Treaty in 1882, a mixed bag of uneven obligations (secret, once again) which weighed more heavily on Germany than the other two parties, but which were overwhelmingly defensive in tone. The Germans hoped that the Italians would now be less likely to covet a dalliance with France.

With the British quiescent and non-aligned (a longstanding policy), Bismarck continued weaving his web of alliances, seeking to preserve the balance of power in Europe. Rumania came on board in 1883 and France found herself isolated. So it would have remained had not William II, Bismarck's Emperor, disposed of his Chancellor in March 1890. He was then persuaded not to renew the secret bilateral treaty with Russia. However, other factors were also in play. German industry, her naval ambition and colonial aspirations served to antagonize Russia and the growth of Pan-Slavism fuelled Russia's determination to dominate in the Balkans, at Austria's expense. William was obliged to choose between Austria and Russia and chose the former. The latter, perforce, now became an opponent. As a consequence, the French finally had a dance partner, the Entente of 1891 ripening into the Alliance of 1894.(8) Once again, secret, although hinted at copiously, the better to keep Germany in her box.

There matters rested, for a time. The Germans sensed the new landscape and accorded her neighbours more respect, but the Kaiser remained content. England held the Balance of Power and it was not possible to imagine her joining such longstanding opponents as Russia and France in an alliance of any stripe. By 1902, the Italians – inevitably – were playing both sides against the middle, renewing the Triple Alliance whilst leaking its terms to the French.(9) The Franco-Italian accord of that year provided that Italy would no longer help Germany in the case of a French attack, thus cancelling one of the essential purposes of the Alliance:

“Henceforth, Italy had a foot in both camps and could jump in either direction, though she was not wholly trusted by either her old ally or her new friend.”(10)

As the Italians had always been a liability, there was no five-alarm fire in Germany. However, it was apparent that England and France were drawing closer – in colonial matters, at any rate – as evidenced by the Anglo-French Convention of 1904 (more popularly known as the Entente Cordiale), concerning the fate of Egypt and Morocco.(11) England had put the feelers out to Germany in 1899, a first, proposing a secret convention on colonial spheres of influence, but the Kaiser had been less than keen. It should not have been a surprise to see her reaching out to France instead, as her policy of splendid isolation was clearly destined for the grey cylindrical file. Especially as France was allied with Russia, England with Japan and the Russo-Japanese had just broken out two months prior. England wished to keep that war in the East, not have it spread to Europe.

There is little evidence that either party wanted to put Germany's nose out of joint. The French, perhaps, were a little more keen on normalising relations and picking up another friend-of-sorts, as the alliance with Russia had proved underwhelming and didn't look like it was going to improve any time soon. The Germans were, however, unsurprisingly unimpressed. They, too, had interests in Morocco (formalised in the international Morocco Treaty of 1880), yet now they found themselves blind-sided by an agreement to which they had not been party.

Chancellor Bülow and the Kaiser had different takes on what to do. The Chancellor remained schtum, attempting to induce a French confession. The Kaiser, on the other hand, got proactive and attempted to realise his dream of a Continental League, comprising the five Great European Powers (or four-and-a-half, given that Italy was one of them). Neither modus operandi bore fruit. So, Bülow persuaded the Kaiser to drop in at Tangiers on his way from Hamburg to Corfu – by way of a middle finger to the English and the French – and then proposed an international conference of all the Powers who had signed the 1880 agreement. Most could be relied upon to back the German point of view.

The French government found itself in an awkward position. Having taken no heed of Germany's legitimate interests in Morocco, it was now likely to be humiliated. Domestic political opposition realised that dangerous imperialist policies had placed them in a position of peril. The English backed the French – there had been a persistent anti-German bias in the English press going back decades – and the crisis didn't pass until a conference in 1906. France's Foreign Minister - Théophile Delcassé – proved to be collateral damage, which did not sit well with the French.

But it was the Germans who came across as the baddies, even though it was the French and the English who had trampled all over the diplomatic niceties in the first instance – the very definition of a Pyrrhic victory. And despite the fact that Delcassé was the chief political exponent of “The New France”, which sought to encircle and isolate Germany and force her to either hand back Alsace-Lorraine or suffer the consequences. He was far from being the only French statesman still smarting from his country's demotion from Grande Nation to also-ran after German unification.(12)

Meanwhile, the Russians were having their ass handed to them. Flexing to the East – when the East meant Japan – by stationing 100,000 troops in Manchuria and refusing to leave turned out to be bad policy, despite her far larger navy and army. Poor leadership and morale, in the face of the fanatical zeal of the Japanese infantryman, made for a lacklustre campaign, fought over a non-vital interest, and led to defeats on land and at sea. At home, the peasants were revolting in a dry run of what was to come in 1917 and the Tsarist autocracy was obliged to yield absolute power and establish a constitutional monarchy, complete with a parliament of sorts.(13) When US President Theodore Roosevelt offered to mediate a truce in late 1905, the Russians were more than ready to walk away and lick their wounds.

“At the beginning of the present century... Russian policy looked toward Asia, while the Balkans were neglected and Russia’s western borders secured by cultivating good relations with her western neighbors, Germany and Austria-Hungary. Then came the Japanese war, which heartily sickened Russians of Eastern adventures, while the ensuing Revolution drove all thoughts of foreign policy temporarily from men’s minds.”(14)

The Brits had interpreted the Kaiser's Moroccan adventure as evidence that the Germans were attempting to break up the Triple Entente by targeting the French. Anti-German opinion in the press and wider society was becoming dangerously strong and the government of the day (unwisely) allowed itself to be drawn ever closer by the French. Even though the Anglo-French Entente was more of a diplomatic nicety than a firm commitment to pile in if the French were attacked, official (but secret) military and naval 'conversations' were approved; however, informal arrangements tend to become honourable undertakings in due course.(15) It's unlikely that two parties, having spent years plotting military responses, would then part with a cheery wave upon the onset of hostilities.

At this juncture, the system of alliances stabilised. Eight years later, in 1914, the same Powers faced each other – Germany, Austro-Hungary and the feckless Italians on one side, France, Russia and a slightly reticent Britain on the other. Italy was seen as a more of a floater, in both senses of the word and, when she switched sides in 1915, nobody stepped back in amazement. The intervening years were still full of incident, with two imbroglios to the fore; firstly, the Balkan cauldron, in which Serbia's ambition (the Greater Serbia problem) was constantly needling the Dual Monarchy and obliging the not-yet-ready Russia to support her fellow Slavs in the near-abroad; and, secondly, the ever-present 'German problem'.

The strongest of these Powers were tribes and the prestige in which they were held was extremely important to them. It is tempting to see this as either overly sensitive or as a somewhat puerile preoccupation with their place in the pecking order. But, while the political elites were as remote as today's are, they do seem to have been relatively mindful of those they represented and maintaining a country's status as a Great Power wasn't only a matter of pride; it was also in the citizens' interests economically.

However, there was a definite disconnect between the differing flavours of constitutional monarchies (plus a Russian autocracy) that dominated the European scene. The Kaiser retained considerable power as the head of the executive branch, as did the Emperor/King of Austro-Hungary. The Tsar was an absolute monarch, but Britain had effectively neutered her monarch by then and the French, famously, did likewise by the deployment of the national razor in 1792.

Parliamentary democracy held sway on each side of the Channel and, while that form of government was more responsive to the vagaries of public opinion, it was also prone to inconsistency in terms of policy. In consequence, any modus vivendi that had been arrived at was necessarily a temporary arrangement of uncertain duration. This reality necessarily coloured perceptions and undermined trust, as a change of government was always likely to result in a change of emphasis in foreign policy.

By 1907, the Russians and the Japanese had kissed and made up and were intent on jointly exploiting opportunities in Manchuria and the French had also inked a commercial treaty with Japan. Taken together with the Anglo-French rapprochement (and another colonial arrangement between Britain and Russia which effectively partitioned Persia), it was clear that Germany was getting the cold-shoulder treatment. An attempt at an Entente with the Americans was kicked to the kerb by Roosevelt and a pattern was set which would define the next seven years. In short, the Triple Alliance would grow weaker and less united, while the Triple Entente became stronger. The former was chronically undermined Austria's Balkan entanglements and by friction between her and a hubristic Italy:

“The Triple Entente, on the other hand, became relatively stronger, because its members were not divided from one another by any such sharp conflicts of interest as between Austria and Italy, and because England, France, and Russia were able to make increasingly close arrangements for military and naval cooperation.”(16)

Germany was also frequently embarrassed by the 'stupidities' that Austria indulged in – especially with regards to Serbia – but wasn't in a position to be overly censorious due to her need to keep what friends she had close. As it was, the Germans were convinced that they were being encircled, by France and Britain to the west and Russia and Japan to the east. They were also of the opinion that London was determined to retain its military supremacy, on land and at sea, by trying to force on them a limitation in armaments at a time when they had to cater for the possibility that a war with the Triple Entente would need to be fought on two fronts.

The Kaiser was determined to build up the German navy, “to give expression to the greatness of the New Germany by creating a fleet which should be comparable to her growing commerce and colonial interests and afford them protection.”(17) Admiral Tirpitz desired what he termed a 'risk navy', a fleet large enough to prompt the British to make diplomatic concessions in the colonial world rather than risk a conflict. He had in mind a ration of 2:3 or similar. The Brits more assuredly did not, but the British preoccupation with the new Dreadnought design afforded the Germans an opportunity. Whilst they were hopelessly outnumbered in smaller ships, they could approach parity in the larger design – nine versus twelve keels by 1908.(18) The arms race was on.

The refusal of Germany to come to an arrangement with the British is given as evidence of her hostile intent and as one of the major causes of the eventual conflict. However, Britain had greatly strengthened her North Sea fleet and begun to build Dreadnoughts before proposing that Germany retard her naval ambitions. The military had also reorganized the British Expeditionary Force and, as noted, established closer relations with both France and Russia. To the Germans, it felt like an attempt at intimidation and to cede would be “inconsistent with Germany's dignity as a Great Power.”(19) I have more sympathy with that assessment than I do any other.

The British were determined to maintain their supremacy at sea, to safeguard commercial interests and service the Empire, but they could also see that much bitterness would be engendered by further naval competition, not to mention the financial burden that would be shared by both countries. So, they did genuinely wish to come to an arrangement, but one that worked in their favour. Germany, on the other hand, was not minded to allow another Power to dictate her policies. Perhaps the tone of Tirpitz and the Kaiser was a touch stentorian, but it's difficult to see how any other outcome could have eventuated. And it's also difficult to excuse an inability on the part of the British to understand how their actions would be interpreted.

Meanwhile, the intractable Balkan problem was brought to the front burner by a Russian initiative that, even at this remove, is difficult to credit. Izvolski, the Foreign Minister, somehow thought it politic to pursue Russia's perennial ambition to secure the Straits to the Black Sea by inviting the Austrians to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina. He calculated that his partners in the Triple Entente would have no objections. He was wrong but, worse still, the Austrians went through with their side of the bargain and then refused to back off when Russia's allies forbade action.(20)

And, yet worse, “...his consent to having Orthodox Greek Bosnians placed under the Roman Catholic sovereignty of the Hapsburgs”(21) was not greeted by dancing in the streets in Russia, nor Serbia. Austria and Serbia began to mobilize against each other. The Germans then found a solution and it was now Russia's turn to be humiliated, which was deeply resented – despite the fact that the wound was self-inflicted.

A new Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, took office in 1909, a well-respected man, both home and abroad, who wished to maintain peace in Europe. To that end, he sought a naval compromise with the British, but the Kaiser and Tirpitz wouldn't consent. That particular sore continued to suppurate. Sazanov replaced Izvolski – once the latter felt that his resignation would not be linked to his precipitation of the Bosnian Crisis – and proved to be an upgrade, but of the flawed variety. He was well-disposed towards Germany and desirous of peace, but somewhat paranoid about Teutonic influence in the Balkans. He was also overly concerned as to the opinions of the Russian press, given that only 10% of Russians could read.(22) And the press (just as in France and Britain) hated Germany. It was also rabidly Pan-Slav in orientation. It seems that a desire to avoid criticism was Sazanov's Achilles' heel. Largely as a consequence, a promising start to relations was gradually frittered away.

Which was not something that could be said of Franco-German relations, as these had never warmed to a point at which a subsequent cooling-off would be discernible. The French simply could not reconcile themselves to a world in which, in their view, “exhibitions of the German habit of thumping the green table with the mailed fist to secure diplomatic victories” -(23) otherwise known as asserting her national interest, in a way that France would unhesitatingly emulate were she still ascendant. Her leaders did not want war either, but they resolved to fight rather than back down if a new crisis unfolded – the small matter of the agreement with Britain seems to have stiffened their spine.

But in truth, throughout the first decade of the new century, Germany had demonstrated no ill-will towards the French and, with the exception of the Alsace-Lorraine conundrum, there was no obvious source of future rancour, other than there being a sulphurous resentment at Germany's rise. Gallic histrionics were nothing new but, when backed by a perception that Britain would bail them out if France saw fit to force an issue, they assumed a different character. Particularly when Raymond Poincaré took responsibility for foreign policy in January 1912, at which point:

“...he exercised a strong influence in the direction of an aggressive and dangerous policy, which was not a reflection of the wishes of the great majority of the truly peace-loving French people from 1912 to 1914, and which they would not have approved, had they been fully aware of it and the catastrophe to which it was leading.”(24)

Poincaré needed to keep his friends close, so he assured the Russians that he would back them in the Balkans and attempted to firm up the more amorphous arrangement with the Brits with a written agreement. Lord Grey, Britain's Foreign Minister, wished to keep his hands free and was able to kid himself into believing that withdrawing the British Mediterranean fleet so that it might patrol off France's Atlantic coast (whilst the French fleet headed to the Med) did not impose on Britain “an inescapable moral obligation to protect the coast of France in case of a war between France and Germany”.(25) Grey also agreed that, if there was reason to expect “an unprovoked attack” on France, then the two governments would “discuss” whether to act in concert.(26) It would, therefore, be necessary to paint the Germans as the aggressors were there to be a conflict.

Sazanov repaid Poincaré's support - which had the effect of altering the character of their alliance from a purely defensive purpose into support for Russia's Balkan adventurism – by repeatedly leaving the French out of the loop. In March 1912, for instance, Poincaré discovered that the Russians had secretly assisted in the formation of the Balkan League the previous winter, an alliance between Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro against the Ottoman Empire.(27) Once he was apprised of the substance of the agreements, he exclaimed “C'est un instrument de guerre”.(28) He wasn't mistaken – the alliance launched the First Balkan War in October of the same year.

Poincaré ought to have been appalled at the duplicity and would have been wise to have reined Sazanov in. But the war went well and he preferred to focus on the increased respect for the Triple Entente that had been engendered by military victories. The Serbs had occupied northern Albania and wanted to maintain access to the Adriatic. The Austrians and the Italians wanted them out. The Russians weren't ready for war (none of the Great Powers were in 1912) and the question was referred to a Conference of Ambassadors, a favoured method of resolving disputes at that time.

Whilst a wider war had not transpired, it was clear that it could have. It was also clear that the Russians were not trustworthy allies and that, rather as France used the threat of British power to gain traction, Sazanov had used France. A similar metamorphosis was ongoing in the Triple Alliance. Bismarck had always been at pains to ensure that the Austrians understood that they were in a defensive alliance but, by 1909, Vienna was convinced that;

“...if Austria attacked Serbia, she could count on a threat of German mobilisation to bluff Russia into remaining inactive; or upon German support, if Russia made war”.(29)

It can, therefore, be seen that Russia and Austria were the Great Powers most committed to intrigue and that France and Germany were more of a guarantor than anything else. Neither of the latter had any interest in the Balkans, yet both of them allowed themselves to be manoeuvred into a perilous position. It was their backing that made the principal protagonists bold. By contrast, Italy and Britain were peripheral figures at this point, but each was also vulnerable due to their own alliances with the players.

Grey may have thought Britain uncommitted in the event of a war of aggression by an ally and who knows what Italy was thinking – other than how to best evade an on-the-ground commitment – but the country that first declares war isn't always the genuine initiator of hostilities. On occasion, a combatant may be left with little in the way of options in the face of provocation and that potential circumstance was a clear and present danger. Yet both the Germans and the French were afflicted by a timidity that caused them to give their respective problem children too much slack. The fear of isolation – particularly for Germany, which already felt surrounded – was more powerful than the risk of a war triggered by ambition. To a large extent, four Powers were along for the ride, each of them unwilling to make a grab for the steering wheel.

The Balkans Wars ratcheted up the tension between the two blocs -there was a second conflict in 1913 when Bulgaria unwisely attacked its allies in a fit of pique, which then induced both Romania and the Ottomans to pile on in anticipation of territorial gains, which duly arrived when Bulgaria was trounced in just over a month.(30) They didn't do much for relationships between allies, either. Germany was continually aggravated by Austrian selfishness (yet continued to support her) and France and Russia bickered over the Ottoman Empire, but without falling out over it. The German approach to Austria's Greater Serbia problem was, at times, schizophrenic, sometimes urging a dynamic approach, but usually counselling for diplomacy. Until Sarajevo, that is.(31)

The instability prompted a logical, but problematic, reaction – an increase in the size of the Great Powers' armies and armaments. The Germans and the French (independently) augmented their armies and Russia made great efforts to train and equip more of her vast population.(32) Each new initiative caused suspicion and unease, yet no-one attempted to even feather the brake. Woodrow Wilson sent his advisor, Colonel House, to Europe to bang heads together, to no avail. His outsider's view is interesting:

“The situation is extraordinary...Unless someone acting for you can bring about a different understanding, there is some day to be an awful cataclysm. No one in Europe can do it. There is too much hatred, too many jealousies. Whenever England consents, France and Russia will close in on Germany and Austria.”(33)

And so, by 1912/13, the stage had been set. It would have been more remarkable if there hadn't been a Great War. When empires implode – as was the case with the late-stage collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the increasingly unstable Austro-Hungarians – they rarely do so with a whimper. When two are simultaneously past their sell-by date, ructions are inevitable and, as Nature abhors a vacuum, it is natural that other Powers are also on the rise.

The swift rise of Germany was powerfully resented, especially by the French and the British; the former because her historic enemy was now more than a match for her, the latter because she was having to strain every sinew in maintaining her pre-eminence and paying through the nose for the privilege, all because Germany didn't know her place. And, although Russia wasn't quite there yet, it was apparent that she soon would be, if left unmolested. The United States, too. The Old World was being left behind, but those who controlled that world weren't prepared to let it happen. There was always going to be a lit match thrown into the tinder. That it was the Balkans – and, more particularly, the Serbs – that supplied it, was entirely unsurprising.

The Serbs had been under the Turkish yoke since 1389, with a twenty year interregnum from 1717 when Austria got as far as Belgrade before falling back, taking many Serbian peasants with them. Harmony was short-lived, however, as economic oppression by their Magyar landlords persuaded a good proportion that Turkish misrule was the lesser of two evils.(34) Mutual antipathy towards the Ottomans meant that the respective governments rubbed along together with little friction until 1903. It was then that a band of conspirators murdered the Serbian king and his wife and, instead of wailing and gnashing of teeth, the Serbs rang the church bells in rejoicing. This was too rich for the crowned heads of Europe, most of whom withdrew their representatives from Belgrade in protest.

The new king was, nonetheless, popular with the people. Unfortunately, he was a Russophile and a dedicated believer in a Greater Serbia – the reunification of Serbs, Bosniaks, Slovenes, Croats and Dalmatians. This included those Serbs still living in Austria and southern Hungary. Austria had no difficulty in reading the runes and thought it probable that Russia would encourage such ambitions. And a surge in Serbian nationalistic fervour might prove contagious and th Rumanians, Czechs and Slovaks under Hapsburg rule might get ideas of their own. So, the Austrians started meddling in Serbia's affairs.

It did not go well. Every provocation simply drove the Serbs ever further into Russia's welcoming embrace. The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908, whilst strengthening Austria's grip on the Balkans in general, was not greeted with enthusiasm in Belgrade. Izvolski's allegation of double-dealing didn't sweeten the mood, either, but he held the Serbs in check whilst he attempted to salvage the Straits half of the deal with the French and the British. As previously noted, it was Germany who pulled his cojones from the flames, for which action she was excoriated in the Russian press (and the English), which distorted the facts “into the legend that Germany had threatened Russia with force and humiliated her with an ultimatum”.(35)

The Serbs were understandably unmollified and the form of words that they were obliged to render will not have improved the mood:

“Serbia recognizes that she has not been affected in her rights by the fait accompli created in Bosnia and...in deference to the advice of the Great Powers...undertakes to renounce the attitude of protest and opposition which she has adopted...”(36)

The Austrians (albeit prompted by the Russians) had breached an international treaty, humiliated another nation and earned the distrust of other Powers. And the Serbians were always going to live down to expectations, which Izvolski encouraged by referring to the annexation as Serbia's Alsace-Lorraine.(37) Serbia confidently expected to seize Bosnia and Herzegovina by force, with Russian support, at some point in the near-future. She was no doubt fortified in that belief by Russian patronage of the undercover Balkan League.

Then, in the First Balkan War, the Serbians doubled their territory and achieved long-cherished access to the sea. Russia energetically supported their claim to northern Albania. The Albanians thought differently, as did Austria and Italy. European peace was threatened once again, by a compromise that pleased no-one and which deprived Serbia of her ill-gotten gains in Albania, but left her with much new territory and vaunting confidence. Her Prime Minister was openly speaking of preparing for round two against Austria.(38)

When it seemed as if Serbia would expand further with victory in the Second War, the Germans had to (once again) prevent the Austrians from attempting to solve the Greater Serbia problem by force of arms, particularly when the Serbs reoccupied northern Albania and refused to leave. But in October 1913, Austria issued an ultimatum – again without prior notification to her allies – and the Serbian bluff was called. The lesson being that the compromise that pleased no-one could only be given life by the threat of force. But Austria was gradually losing her grip, nonetheless, as Rumania grew distant in the spring of 1914.

Such was the scene by summer 1914. Turkey in disarray, Russia re-arming as swiftly as possible, the British locked in competition with Germany, France trying to shore up her status, Austro-Hungary hanging on for grim death and Serbia in the grip of a fever dream of empire. For reasons that must be complicated – because, on the face of it, there was no evidence to support it – the press and public in all three of the allies in the Triple Entente primarily viewed Germany as an international pariah.

The latter had effectively issued a blank cheque to the Austrians, by virtue of their continued support; the French had done likewise with the Russians, as had the Russians with the Serbians. Each alliance was, therefore, primarily guided by the actions of the most volatile members, because the heavyweights within them were terrified of solitude. Italy was of little consequence and the United States was resolutely uninvolved - which is not to say that entities from the US had no interest in what was unfolding in Europe. Where there is war, there is also profit.

And so, to Sarajevo. Archduke Franz Ferdinand wasn't simply a nobleman – he was heir-presumptive to the throne of Austro-Hungary and likely to ascend to the top job in short order, as Franz Joseph I was 83 years old at the time. He was, ironically, in favour of a cautious approach to Serbia, a position which brought him into frequent conflict with those who advocated a pre-emptive war.(39) But on 28^th June 1914, both he and his wife were assassinated by Gavrilo Princip, a Bosnian Serb and an agent of the secret Serbian society, the Black Hand, headed by a Colonel in the General Staff.(40) The Austrians, having caught Princip and other co-conspirators, were swiftly convinced that the Serbian government itself was involved, an impression that was reinforced when, two days after the killings, “the matter had not yet engaged the attention of the Serbian police” and they were further informed that “the matter did not concern the Serbian government.”(41)

It is now known that the government knew about the plot a month prior and that an attempt to stop the assassins crossing the border into Bosnia a week later was a failure.(42) But no adequate warning was then issued to the Austrians, despite the fact that the Serbian Prime Minister, Pashitch, was well aware of the likely outcome if the killing was accomplished. Serbia was in bad odour, with a record “already too spotted with blood to stand the disgrace of another political murder.”(43) Whilst there is no doubt that Pashitch was between the hammer and the anvil, no specifics were relayed to Vienna; the only communication was unofficial and far too vague to have been of any import. Thus, a circumstance that could have been easily averted, wasn't.

The Austrians took their time. Berchtold, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, needed to get his ducks in a row. The German Kaiser, a naturally impetuous man, could not understand the delay, but Berchtold had to talk the Premier of Hungary around to his position. He was also aware that Poincaré was currently in St. Petersburg and wanted him incommunicado on the high seas when he presented his ultimatum. He calculated that his desire to keep Austria's upcoming conflict with Serbia localised would be best served if the Russians and the French weren't huddled together come the moment.(44) Because to Berchtold, it was now clear that the measured approach had failed and that Serbia had to dealt with, once and for all. Austria's status as a Great Power demanded it.

Though there was a frenzy of diplomatic activity over the next month – and much shading of positions to fit the fast-changing circumstances – the one constant was Berchtold's implacability. Not that others realised, necessarily. Even though the feeling that 'war was inevitable' had been ever-present for several years, all the other Powers made efforts to forestall it during the July Crisis. But, even when it became apparent that a wider war was probable, the Austrians pressed on regardless. The Germans did not realise this until very late in the piece, when Powers were mobilising all over the show. They were always playing catch-up, but it tended to come across as collusion.

Initially, Francis Joseph and the Germans counselled moderation. The Kaiser decided to head off on his annual northern cruise, not as a ruse to lull the other Powers into inaction before a sudden attack – as legend often has it – but because he did not believe that war was imminent.(45) Ahead of Berchtold's eventual ultimatum, the Germans were not aware that a new resolve had taken hold in Vienna. The belief was that, while there may be “some energetic political steps” in the works,(46) they would not amount to an upending of the Balance of Power. But the form of words the Germans came up with constitutes the second major lash-up and is the source of Germany's share of the blame for what was allowed to transpire:

“Austria must judge what is to be done to clear up her relation to Serbia; whatever Austria's decision may turn out to be, Austria can count with certainty upon it, that Germany will stand behind her as an ally and friend”.(47)

The blank cheque, fraudulently obtained. Berchtold was already talking of partitioning Serbia, although he denied it to the Germans when word slipped out. He also knew that the intended terms of his ultimatum would be unacceptable to Serbia and that war would inevitably result. Neither the Kaiser nor Bethmann were in the know. However, no matter the duplicity, the error in judgement was still colossal:

“The Kaiser and his advisers on July 5 and 6 were not criminals plotting World War; they were simpletons “putting a noose around their necks” and handing the other end of the rope to a stupid and clumsy adventurer who now felt free to go as far as he liked”.(48)

By 13^th July, Berchtold's seeming indecision (a trait that he was known for) had partially squandered any initial sympathy for Austria's predicament. Additionally, no evidence of the Serbian government's guilt had been provided. His man in Sarajevo couldn't find any, although he was confident that the crime was planned in Belgrade and involved Serbian officials.(49) This was disingenuous; in a country of Serbia's size, ignorance of such a plot would be implausible. But Berchtold wasn't bothered about appearances; he was in possession of a blank cheque. In his mind, there was no need to convince anyone of anything. Anyone abroad, anyway. The following day he obtained internal agreement to an ultimatum with a short deadline, which would inevitably lead to an immediate local war with Serbia.(50) And, at that point, that was all that he desired. Had he wanted a World War, he would have presented it whilst the Tsar and Poincaré were still sequestered. Instead, it was delayed until 23^rd July, at 5pm. He calculated that the French would be in the Baltic by then.

There are questions marks over who knew what prior to its presentation. Berchtold had made himself difficult to get hold of and breached undertakings with his own Emperor and with both Italy and Germany. None of them knew the exact contents of the Note,(51)(52)(53) despite being assured that they would be informed and Austrian officials actively misdirected all and sundry. On July 11^th, one of the principal Serbophobes counselling for a crushing blow, was assuring an English colleague that “personally he was not in favour of pressing Serbia too hard...and that he did not view the situation in a pessimistic light”.(54)

But while it suited Serbia and the Triple Entente to profess total surprise at Austria's terms, this contention is merely another strand of the victor's narrative. Lord Grey knew of the thrust of it a week before the Note was presented. He also knew that Austro-Hungary would follow through regardless and believed that Germany was in full agreement. The French were up to speed by the 21^st at the latest and even the Italians sensed the mood.(55) But the Germans were not the active players that the other Powers believed them to be – not for the first time. Berchtold was less than forthcoming with them, too.

Prior to securing Hungary's backing on July 14^th, he had kept Germany fully informed. The German's were aware that the terms that would be presented “would be so exacting that Serbia could hardly accept them, and that an acceptance would be “very disagreeable” to him.”(56) By encouraging Austria to speedy action, Germany was signalling her understanding that an Austro-Serbian conflict was incoming and that she was optimistic that it would be localised.

Austria was urged to publish a dossier of the evidence of Serbian complicity in the assassination of Franz Ferdinand prior to issuing the Note, in the belief that doing so would mollify the other Powers, but Berchtold ignored the advice.(57) He was also told to keep Italy in the loop, but didn't. Germany repeatedly requested further information as to the precise terms of the Note, but was stonewalled. The Germans were not shown the final text until the evening prior to its serving, at which point it had already been despatched to Belgrade. Bethmann thought it “too sharp”.(58)

Technically, the ultimatum – when it came - wasn't a declaration of war, but it was the next best thing. Serbia would be required to prostrate herself before Austria and fulfil a multitude of tasks aimed at destroying the Black Hand organisation, in conjunction with the Austro-Hungarian government, whose representatives would partake in the mopping up whilst on Serbian soil. The government would have been required to not only renounce the Greater Serbia project; it would have been required to remove any enthusiasts from positions of power.(59) As the government favoured said project – the dispute with the Black Hand was concerned with how best to bring it about – and would not survive without so doing, accepting the Note in its entirety was a non-starter.

The Serbs were given forty-eight hours and they fashioned a skilful reply designed to give apologists an opportunity to wilfully misinterpret it as a capitulation of sufficient magnitude as to give Austria no option but to accept it, when it did nothing of the sort. It also ensured that the Austrians would be be framed as the instigator of what came next, no doubt at the behest of Big Brother. And, given Berchtold's intent and Germany's acceptance of a limited war, there is no doubt that considerable blame must be attached to the Teutons.

Austria's decision to fight a localised war after a long period of general Great Power escalation, against an enemy which enjoyed the de facto protection of another Power – which was itself allied to two further Powers – seems extraordinarily reckless. There was absolutely no guarantee that the conflict would remain contained and, as we know, it didn't. The World War that followed then resulted in the break-up of the very empire that she was trying to preserve. But the Austrian leadership – very much at Berchtold's direction – came to the conclusion that a dangerous gamble was preferable to what they believed would otherwise be death by a thousand cuts and, as we shall see, had it not been for Russia's brinkmanship (ably abetted by the French), it may have succeeded.

It is noteworthy that, once the wheels were set in motion on July 23^rd, none of the Powers acted in ways that were at odds with what one would expect. But all were forever being left behind by developments or getting momentarily up to speed, before being once again forced to reset. No-one got a proper grip on proceedings. Had Germany or, especially, Britain taken control, disaster might have been averted. But Berchtold was allowed to steer a course into the abyss.

On the morning of July 24^th, Bethmann still believed the situation was salvageable and “that the more energetically they appeared to support Austria, the more likely they would be to succeed in “localizing” the conflict and preventing the other Powers from interfering”.(60) It seems not to have occurred to him that an immediate endorsement of Austria's demands – whilst claiming to have had no foreknowledge of them – would achieve something else entirely; a conviction that that “Germany not only approved of, but had instigated Austria's action; that this action was not aimed merely at Serbia, but was the pretext for a wider war”.(61) Which was, admittedly, a stretch, but Bethmann seems to have under-estimated the suspicion with which Germany was regarded.

The Italians were not impressed at being placed in jeopardy by Austrian duplicity. Sazonov had previously made it known that Russia “would not be indifferent to any effort to humiliate Serbia”,(62) and had then been mollified by the Austrian ambassador. Poincaré had also counselled caution.(63) Both France and Russia were attempting to rein in Berchtold right up to July 23^rd, fearing that the long silence – of nearly four weeks – portended ill. But the latter got his timing right and Poincaré was on board the SS France when the other shoe dropped. The following morning the Powers learned of the Austrian demands.

Grey thought the Note “the most formidable document he had ever seen addressed by one State to another that was independent”.(64) The French tried to broker a compromise, but somewhat lethargically. The Russians, however, seem to have had the clearest understanding of what was in the wind. When Sazanov received the Austrian ambassador he stated that “you want war, and have burned your bridges”.(65) Given the short time limit, the lack of a dossier of evidence and the demands themselves, the logical conclusion would be just that. After three weeks of deceit – during which he had been assured that the demands would be mild(ish) – Sazanov was not prepared to give the Austrians the benefit of the doubt. The French ambassador was also encouraging him to stand firm. And so, the next escalation was initiated.

It was generally understood that mobilisation meant war; that once it had been begun, there was no expectation that it would be halted. This gave Sazanov a problem – of all the Great Powers, a Russian mobilisation would be the most drawn out. The knock-on effect of that was a considerable vulnerability in the early phases of a conflict, especially to the West. He, therefore, wished to ameliorate this weakness with a partial mobilisation (directly against Austria), which he would announce. He intended such to be “a warning to Germany and an effectual bluff to stop Austria from attacking Serbia”.(66) Unfortunately, there was a flaw in this brilliant plan, one that would have been apparent had he consulted the military first. Namely, there was no such plan in the locker – it was all or nothing and partial followed by full mobilisation would be carnage. So, naturally, that's what the Russians did.

Sazanov was not the cool head that the occasion required. On the evening of the 24^th, he was telling the German ambassador that “hate is foreign to my nature. I do not hate Austria; I despise her” and that “Austria is seeking a pretext to gobble up Serbia; but in that case Russia will make war on Austria”.(67) The prospect of localising any conflict was dimming by the hour. And given Sazanov's sentiments, it was asking a lot of the Germans and others to believe that the mobilisation truly was partial. Especially as the Russians were in the throes of extensive industrial strikes – “the idea of a foreign war to avert domestic troubles is, of course, a very familiar one in the history of many countries”.(68)

Nonetheless, Sazanov does seem to have hoped that he could call Austria's bluff. He also instigated other preparatory measures across the empire. He thought that he was engineering the best of both worlds:

“He could continue to negotiate, and he held in his hand the threat of force to strengthen his bluff; but at the same time military preparations would be going on preparatory to a general mobilisation if his bluff of partial mobilization was called.”(69)

These preparations would be for a war against Germany, as well. But expecting others to indulge his fantasies was naïve in the extreme. Germany knew of Russia's vulnerabilities regarding full mobilisation and was likely to be highly sceptical of Russia's 'trial mobilisations'. Between July 26^th and July 30^th, the Germans received 28 separate reports of Russian preparations, with no fewer than sixteen of them related to the Russian border with Germany.(70) And while Sazanov may have intended deterrence, the Russian military viewed war as a settled matter from the 25^th onwards. Any form of mobilisation is, after all, “an exceedingly dangerous means of exerting diplomatic pressure “(71) and the odds were that it would not end well. Sazanov's denials, when challenged by the Germans, did not inspire confidence, as it was clear that “preparatory measures are very far-reaching”.(72)

On the evening of the 25^th, he met again with the French and British ambassadors. The French were still all-in on Russia's side, but the British were altogether more reticent. Sazanov played what cards he had, insisting that a resolute Britain would neuter Germany and there would be no war. But, if Britain failed Russia now, “rivers of blood would flow” and she'd still get sucked in eventually.(73) Buchanan, the ambassador, pointed out that Germany was unlikely to allow Russia to turn her weakness into a strength while pretending to negotiate and would probably declare war herself.

When the Serbs replied to the Note, they only truly addressed half of the ten points and rejected the two concerned with Austrian participation in the suppression of 'subversive elements'. They also ordered general mobilisation before their reply was delivered, on the 25^th.(74) Diplomatic relations between the two countries were severed by Austria half an hour after they had received that reply, on the grounds that not all her demands had been agreed to.(75) That same evening, Franz Joseph ordered partial Austrian mobilisation, although there was obvious uncertainty as to who they would be fighting – just Serbia, or Serbia and Russia?

The other Great Powers now attempted further de-escalation – proposals came in a panicked flood. Sazanov seems to have had at least one new plan per day.(76) The Germans kept urging localisation, but the Russians and the French (and, therefore, the British) deemed that suggestion unacceptable:

“The talk about localizing the war merely means that all the Powers are to hold the ring while Austria quietly strangles Serbia. This to my mind is quite preposterous, not to say iniquitous.”(77)

It seems to have started dawning on all concerned that there was likely to be no formula that would avert a wider conflagration. Which didn't mean that they didn't continue to try, but unsuitable proposals came and went in short order. In truth, the ball was in Berchtold's court. If he reverted to type and blinked, peace had a chance. If he followed through, the die was already cast. For two days, there was hope. The official narrative holds that Germany blundered by rejecting a British proposal for yet another Conference of Ambassadors, but she was, once again, facing a Hobson's choice.

Such a conference would drag on for weeks, depriving her of much of the mobilisation advantage she enjoyed. In addition, the proposal was for only four of the Powers and Bethmann believed that Italy would side with Britain and France, leaving Germany in a minority of one to three.(78) So while the Powers may have thought they had been given yet more reasons to doubt German sincerity, they were unable to recognise her position. The Russians were also playing silly buggers:

“Russia and her French ally were insisting that Berlin exercise a moderating influence at Vienna, while Russia herself refused from the outset to accept any such influence, and was supported in this by France. In this respect Russia was pursuing an uncompromising attitude, threatening to the peace of Europe...”(79)

In this, they were echoing the German insistence (prior to 28^th July) that France and Germany should exercise a moderating influence at St. Petersburg, whilst she made no attempt to talk the Austrians down – with one crucial difference; she had finally realised the dangers of Vienna's blank cheque and was attempting to restrain the Austrians, while the Russians were now about to proceed to a general mobilisation, despite being warned that to do so would make a European war inevitable. The Germans brokered direct contact between Sazanov and the Austrian ambassador on July 27^th , but Berchtold was not to be denied and, the next day, declared war on Serbia and began shelling Belgrade.(80)

Bethmann was caught off-guard. The Italians had, as expected, signalled their intention to stand aside, as the Triple Alliance was framed as a defensive alliance and the Austrian Note, “worded so aggressively and so ineptly” made Austria the instigator of any conflict that resulted.(81) Now, Berchtold was also tearing up the script. Berlin had been aware that, were there to be a declaration of war, it would come at around August 12^th, when Austria's armies had fully mobilised. But Berchtold calculated that he would not be able to hold off the Great Powers' peace initiatives for that long. News of the direct conversations with Sazanov convinced him that he needed to act fast. So, he ensured that the “prestige of the Dual Monarchy was now engaged and nothing could prevent conflict”.(82)

Bethmann was already at his wit's end. He knew that Berchtold had been double dealing, that he meant to partition Serbia and that “it was the intention to present portions of Serbia to Bulgaria and presumably also to Albania”,(83) in contravention of assurances given to Germany and of the guarantees that he, in turn, had given the Powers. The Kaiser, having read Serbia's response to the Note, believed that “no more cause for war exists”.(84) Yet still, Bethmann was insufficiently vigorous in his upbraiding of the Austrians:

“He was too much concerned with preventing the odium of responsibility for a war from falling on Germany and Austria, rather than preventing such a war altogether.”(85)

The Tsar was also desperately seeking solutions and Sazanov was trying to get hold of Berchtold, who was avoiding him as he was aware that the Russians intended to discuss modifications to Austria's ultimatum, a process that he flatly rejected. Bethmann was still battling away and Grey was now fully engaged, suggesting possible formulas that would satisfy Vienna and St. Petersburg while simultaneously puncturing expectations of British neutrality if Germany became involved. If the conflict could be limited to Austria and Russia, Britain could stand aside. But if the French and the Germans became involved, it would be a different story.(86)

Bethmann was horrified and “urgently and emphatically” urged “the adoption of mediation”, without which “we are face to face with a conflagration in which England will be against us; Rumania and Italy according to all indications will not be for us, and we shall stand two against four Powers,”(87) which was his strongest warning to Austria yet, but which still fell short, because there was no 'or else'. Had he threatened to abandon Austria to her fate, perhaps Berchtold might have had second thoughts. Perhaps. But Berchtold and his advisers were not for turning and matters were spiralling out of control. The same evening, that of the 30^th, the Russian order for general mobilisation was transmitted, even though the Germans had repeatedly told the Russians that, as this would be directed against both Austria and Germany, it “would necessarily lead to German mobilization and consequently to war”.(88)

The Russian decision had been taken prior to the bombing of Belgrade, then briefly postponed by the Tsar when he was communicating with the Kaiser, then re-instated. The French, Russia's stalwart ally, weren't informed until a day later, but their man in St. Petersburg – who routinely over-promised and failed to keep Paris fully informed - had been pushing for it already, with more fervour than his government evinced . The Austrian general mobilisation took place eighteen hours after the Russians. The Germans were yet to mobilise.(89)

Later, the French attempted to cover for the Russians, by alleging that the order was reversed and that the Russians only mobilised after Austria already had and that Germany had been secretly mobilising for six days already. This was tosh, but indicative of a realisation that Russia's decision was fatal to the chances of peace and that the French had been at least partially responsible for it.(90) Other attempts by the Entente Powers have also muddied the waters, but there is no doubt that the final step to war was initiated by them, not the Austrians, nor the Germans. This is obviously an inconvenience, particularly to the narrative that Germany started a war of aggression. All the Powers understood that “mobilisation means war”.(91) Nonetheless, at this juncture, the only declaration of war had been made by Austria against Serbia.

Poincaré had been anxious to avoid the blame for initiating what he regarded as the inevitability of war, but he – like Bethmann – was not focussed on actually preventing war. On the afternoon of the 30^th, his energies were directed at securing Britain's support, not holding back Russia. Grey was non-committal and Britain's ambassador in Paris hit the nail on the head:

“The French, instead of putting pressure on the Russian Government to moderate their zeal, expect us to give the Germans to understand that we mean fighting if war breaks out. If we gave an assurance of armed assistance to France and Russia now, Russia would become more exacting and France would follow in her wake.”(92)

The French had already started moving troops towards their border with Germany that same morning, although they had been ordered to remain short of the frontier itself, the better to win British approval. However, the Germans were nonetheless aware of French preparations, even prior to the 30^th, but still held off. By then, Bethmann had made his penultimate misstep, which achieved what the French themselves had not. He called for the British ambassador and, in bidding for British neutrality, made proposals that ignored the warning that Grey had delivered earlier the same day, not that he was yet aware of it as it hadn't been translated. He had been told that if Germany and France became embroiled in the conflict, Britain would be unable to stand aside for long. Now, he spoke of the possibility of invading Belgium, as he “could not tell to what operations Germany might be forced by the action of France.”(93)

Understandably, this approach convinced the British that Germany was committed to war and was the cause of much talk of honour. As Grey himself noted:

“...for us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France would be a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover”.(94)

Bethmann, once again, misread his man, but to characterise this intervention as evidence of a Germany that was determined to wage a war of aggression is to mislead. The Germans were aware of the realities of the situation they would be confronted with were both the French and the Russians to join forces against her. They would be required to fight a two front war, with Austria's war against Serbia making her an uncertain partner vis a vis Russia, so they would seek to gain an advantage in France before Russia could fully mobilise. It didn't mean that Germany would do so anyway, just that she would if war came to her. It might have been sensible for Bethmann to spell that out, but he didn't, thus giving the Entente yet another reason to doubt his sincerity, despite the fact Germany's obligatory tactics were hardly a secret:

“It was perfectly recognized in St. Petersburg and Paris, as well as in Berlin, that as Germany would have to fight a war on two fronts, and as she was threatened by the superior number of troops which Russia and France could bring against her, she would have to strike her main blow first at one and then at the other.”(95)

Further, striking straight west would take months due to the hilly terrain and the lines of defensive forts that France had constructed since 1870. The only way of forcing a swift victory – within six weeks or so – was through the flat and less fortified territory of Belgium. Yet, despite intelligence indicating that Russia had ordered a general mobilisation, Bethmann was still hoping for peace on the evening of the 30^th. It wasn't until the following morning that he received final confirmation and realised that the path ahead had been determined. This was when Austria ordered her own mobilisation, while Berchtold gave the Powers the impression that “Austria, in fact, had finally yielded, and that she herself had at this point good hopes of a peaceful issue”.(96)

The only possible barrier to the commencement of wider hostilities now lay in the reluctance of all to be the party that formally went to war. Bethmann took care of that, upon legal advice, as the Hague Convention of 1907 decreed that a warning must be given prior to action. Wanting to go by the book – and not wanting to violate Belgium's sovereignty before Germany was formally at war with both Russia and France – he sent an ultimatum to both,(97) warning Russia that continuing to mobilise would ensure that Germany did likewise, which would mean war and asking the French if they would remain neutral in the event of conflict. An answer was required within eighteen hours.

Sazanov said a suspension was impossible, the French said that “France will act in accordance with her interests”.(98) And so, on 1^st August, both Germany and France ordered general mobilisation and, at 6pm, Bethmann declared war on Russia. It wasn't until 3^rd August that he declared war on France, after alleging several hostile acts that had “forced us into war”,(99) just prior to the launch of Germany's campaign in the west.

In Westminster, Grey had been obliged to cool his heels, as the Cabinet was divided on the question of British involvement in a European War. While personally in favour of intervention, he told the French ambassador that “if France was forced into a war against her wish, it was because if her alliance with Russia. England had purposefully kept clear of alliances in order not to be involved in this way”.(100) On 2^nd August, however, the Cabinet agreed that the British fleet would defend French interests if the German fleet threatened them, thus inching towards solidarity.(101)

That evening the Germans informed the Belgians that they would be forced to cross into Belgium and the following morning they were told that they would be resisted. Britain was a Guaranteeing Power of Belgian neutrality. On the 4^th, Grey was notified that the Germans were on Belgian soil. Bethmann was given until midnight to assure Britain of Germany's good intentions, but could not and Germany and Britain were also now at war – not over France, but over Belgium. Turns out that guaranteeing neutrality involves the same level of commitment as that demanded by an alliance and that guaranteeing Belgium's was a particularly hazardous undertaking, as it was a proxy for an alliance with France.

And so the Great War got underway, despite the fact that none of the Great Powers wanted it to. The later verdict of the Treaty of Versailles was that it was the fault of Germany and her allies and Germany was obliged to agree with that assessment - the exact wording, in Article 231, was as follows:

"The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies."(102)

But it can be seen that blame cannot be so neatly apportioned. It is also apparent that two sets of factors should be considered; the general and the particular. There were underlying stresses which influenced the mindset of the various participants and there were also specific events and omissions that caused war to erupt at that particular juncture. Each entity had their reasons and those reasons made sense to them, if not to others. And the alliances that each had undertaken, whether formal or otherwise, made a general conflagration more likely, not less.

Serbia wished to follow in the footsteps of many other countries and bring all Serbians under a single government. She looked to Russia for assistance and was encouraged to believe that she would receive it when necessary. Having liberated those under Ottoman rule, she now turned her attentions westwards. So far, so half-reasonable. However, her government failed to warn the Austrians of the threat to their heir to the throne and offered no assistance to the Austrian authorities after the event. Indeed, one of the plotters was aided in his escape. So, the Serbs' share of the blame was considerable.

Austria was more responsible for the specific origin of the war than any other Power, yet believed that she was acting in self-defence. But whilst it is true that “no state can be expected to sit with folded arms and await dismemberment at the hands of its neighbours”,(103) it is also true that Austro-Hungary was a multi-national empire whose constituent parts would have preferred autonomy, given the option, and that she could have accepted the inevitable, rather than going to war. In addition, a victory in such a conflict would almost certainly simply delay the inevitable, as Russia would avenge herself once she was fully prepared, militarily. Germany was ill-served by Berchtold's obstinacy and deceptions and, whilst he hoped to keep the conflict localised, when it became clear that this was impossible, he still pressed ahead. He traded in intent, rather than incompetence.

Russia's longstanding obsession with the Balkans – and with control of the Straits – was behind her encouragement of Serbia and placed her in opposition to Austro-Hungary. Sazanov was excitable and prone to obfuscation. And it was Russia's 'secret' preparatory measures, made while still negotiating, and her general mobilisation when Bethmann was belatedly pressuring Berchtold, which proved to be the final straw.

The French, largely in the person of Poincaré, were instrumental in persuading Russia to play a strong hand. No attempt at restraint was countenanced, even when it was clear that Russia's military measures would draw forth counter-measures and war would result. Her ambassador at the Russian court was also culpable. Whilst Poincaré made some efforts at peace, he was more concerned with getting the British onboard than he was with preventing a conflict. It is most likely that, without France's encouragement, Russia would have stood aside and settled for revenge served cold. There was also the small matter of Alsace-Lorraine and a pervasive dissatisfaction with her station in life, especially in relation to Germany.

Grey made many attempts to dissolve tensions, all of which were rejected. His fault lies more with his desire to 'keep his hands free', which encouraged the Germans (in particular) to believe that Britain would remain above any fray. There is also an element of self-delusion involved, as the years of military co-operation with the French and the naval obligations undertaken, plus the commitment to Belgium, ensured that Britain's honour could not be satisfied by neutrality.

He wasn't helped by being the representative of a government that was deeply divided on the merits of conflict. He might have brought the July Crisis to a peaceful conclusion by adopting a more bellicose attitude towards Germany – which might have encouraged Bethmann to rein in Berchtold earlier in the piece – or he could have told Sazanov and Poincaré that Britain would not join them in a European War, which would probably have resulted in a more nuanced approach to matters, but he would have been exceeding his brief in both cases.

Italy was a negligible factor, as was the United States. Japan also stayed out of it. The Ottoman's were in disarray. And Germany? Germany was guilty of being Germany, in the first instance and that was a problem – to other Powers. The contention was that a unified Germany destroyed the Balance of Power in Europe and needed to be taken down a peg or two, but this is mostly an argument that would be made by actors who wanted to maintain the status quo, rather than deal with a new reality. The Germans wanted to dine at the top table; the other Powers – with the exception of Austro-Hungary – were more comfortable with them in the kitchen, eating with the servants. The arms race with Britain and France was the result.

Bethmann was an idealist, not a warmonger. When the Crisis hit, he also proved to be somewhat ham-fisted. He made several errors of judgment, the blank cheque to Austria foremost amongst them. His reluctance to shorten Berchtold's leash created doubts as to his motivations and fuelled the belief that he was the one pulling the Austrian strings, yet the “general mobilization of the continental armies took place in the following order: Serbia, Russia, Austria, France and Germany”.(104) That is not suggestive of pre-emptive aggression. Germany believed – probably correctly – that she could not stand alone in Europe and that abandoning her allies was not an option. Once it became clear that the Russians would not halt their own mobilisation, Bethmann no longer had any cards to play.

“Germany’s geographical position between France and Russia, and her inferiority in number of troops, had made necessary the plan of crushing the French army quickly at first and then turning against Russia. This was only possible, in the opinion of her strategists, by marching through Belgium...”(105)

My guess is that this revisionism is not an account that you are familiar with. I certainly wasn't. But that seems to be the way of it with any narrative you care to mention and a reappraisal of the past is necessary if we are to make sense of the present. Perhaps Blackadder was correct and that, in the final analysis, it was too much trouble not to go to war.

You will, no doubt, have noticed that I haven't yet got around to the European Union, but I will once the remainder of the calumnies have been addressed. The next of those is the Great War itself and that's next up.

Citations

(1) https://jstribune.com/mandelbaum-the-return-of-the-german-problem/

(2) Sidney Bradshaw Fay, The Origins Of The World War 1, Before Sarajevo: Underlying Causes of the War. The MacMillan Company 1930, page 46.

(3) Ditto, page 52.

(4) Ditto, page 56.

(5) Ditto, page 68.

(6) Ditto, page 62.

(7) Ditto, page 80.

(8) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Franco-Russian_Alliance

(9) Sidney Bradshaw Fay, The Origins Of The World War 1, Before Sarajevo: Underlying Causes of the War. The MacMillan Company 1930, page 178.

(10) Ditto, page 180.

(11) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Entente_Cordiale

(12) Lothrop Soddard, Present-Day Europe: Its National States of Mind, Scholar Select.

(13) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_Revolution_of_1905

(14) Lothrop Soddard, Present-Day Europe: Its National States of Mind, Scholar Select.

(15) Sidney Bradshaw Fay, The Origins Of The World War 1, Before Sarajevo: Underlying Causes of the War. The MacMillan Company 1930, page 208.

(16) Ditto, page 224.

(17) Ditto, page 234.

(18) Ditto, page 236.

(19) Ditto, page 239.

(20) Ditto, page 251.

(21) Ditto, page 252.

(22) Ditto, page 266.

(23) Ditto, page 312.

(24) Ditto, page 315.

(25) Ditto, page 323.

(26) Ditto.

(27) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Balkan_League

(28) Sidney Bradshaw Fay, The Origins Of The World War 1, Before Sarajevo: Underlying Causes of the War. The MacMillan Company 1930, page 335.

(29) Ditto, page 344.

(30) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Balkan_War

(31) Sidney Bradshaw Fay, The Origins Of The World War 1, Before Sarajevo: Underlying Causes of the War. The MacMillan Company 1930, page 348.

(32) Ditto, page 350.

(33) Charles Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House (Boston and New York, 1926), I, 249; cj. also G.P., XXXIX, 107-117.

(34) Sidney Bradshaw Fay, The Origins Of The World War 1, Before Sarajevo: Underlying Causes of the War. The MacMillan Company 1930, page 356.

(35) Ditto, page 391.

(36) Ditto, page 393.

(37) Ditto, page 399.

(38) Ditto, page 446.

(39)https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Archduke_Franz_Ferdinand_of_Austria#Political_views

(40) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gavrilo_Princip

(41) Sidney Bradshaw Fay, The Origins Of The World War 1, After Sarajevo: Immediate Causes of the War. The MacMillan Company 1930, page 149.

(42) Ditto, page 62.

(43) Ditto, page 188.

(44) Ditto, page 176.

(45) Ditto, page 209.

(46) Ditto, page 213.

(47) Ditto, page 223.

(48) Ditto.

(49) Ditto, page 237.

(50) Ditto, page 240.

(51) Ditto, page 253.

(52) Ditto, page 254.

(53) Ditto, page 258.

(54) Ditto, page 246.

(55) Ditto, page 248.

(56) Ditto, page 255.

(57) Ditto, page 256.

(58) Ditto, page 266.

(59) Ditto, page 273.

(60) Ditto, page 268.

(61) Ditto.

(62) Ditto, page 281.

(63) Ditto.

(64) Ditto, page 287.

(65) Ditto, page 289.

(66) Ditto, page 291.

(67) Ditto, page 300.

(68) Ditto, page 305.

(69) Ditto, page 308.

(70) Ditto, page 321.

(71) Ditto, page 322.

(72) Eggeling’s report, sent by Pourtalés to Bethmann, July 27, 1 A.M.; K.D., 242.

(73) Sidney Bradshaw Fay, The Origins Of The World War 1, After Sarajevo: Immediate Causes of the War. The MacMillan Company 1930, page 327.

(74) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_I#Prelude

(75) Sidney Bradshaw Fay, The Origins Of The World War 1, After Sarajevo: Immediate Causes of the War. The MacMillan Company 1930, page 349.

(76) Ditto, page 355.

(77) Ditto.

(78) Ditto, page 386.

(79) Ditto, page 392.

(80) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_I#Prelude

(81) Sidney Bradshaw Fay, The Origins Of The World War 1, After Sarajevo: Immediate Causes of the War. The MacMillan Company 1930, page 407.

(82) Ditto, page 419.

(83) Ditto, page 423.

(84) Ditto, page 425.

(85) Ditto.

(86) Ditto, page 436.

(87) Ditto, page 437.

(88) Ditto.

(89) Ditto, page 477.

(90) Ditto.

(91) Ditto, page 479.

(92) Ditto, page 488.

(93) Ditto, page 500.

(94) Ditto, page 501.

(95) Ditto, page 525.

(96) Ditto, page 519.

(97) Ditto, page 528.

(98) Ditto, page 529.

(99) Ditto, page 534.

(100) Ditto, page 538.

(101) Ditto, page 540.

(102) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Versailles

(103) Ditto, page 551.

(104) Ditto, page 554.

(105) Ditto, page 553.